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I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet technologies were originally built, deployed, and used by universities 
and research labs. Usenet is one of these early Internet technologies. It is a distrib-
uted discussion forum and file transfer protocol that has been continually operated 
since 1979. Each fall, new college freshmen would discover Usenet and frustrate 
experienced Usenet users for a month or two with basic questions about how to use 
the technology and how it worked. In September 1993, America Online began al-
lowing their users access to Usenet.1 This triggered a continual influx of new users, 
and it became known as the “September that never ended.”2 Since then the phrase 
“Eternal September” has become a demarcation point for technologists referring to 
problems that result primarily from a lack of technical knowledge.3 
Technology policy remains trapped in an Eternal September despite the fact 
that information technologies are both critical and ubiquitous. Marc Andreessen 
famously announced that software was “eating the world” and that traditional busi-
                                                          
 * Aaron Massey is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Georgia Tech’s School of In-
teractive Computing and the Associate Director of ThePrivacyPlace.org. He earned a 
PhD and MS in Computer Science from North Carolina State University and a BS in 
Computer Engineering from Purdue University. He is a member of the ACM, IEEE, 
IAPP, and the USACM Public Policy Council. 
 1. WENDY M. GROSSMAN, NET.WARS 11 (1998), available at 
http://www.nyupress.org/netwars/contents/contents.html. 
 2. September That Never Ended, THE JARGON FILE, 
http://catb.org/~esr/jargon/html/S/September-that-never-ended.html (last visited Apr. 
7. 2015). 
 3. This Article is not the first to appear in legal academic writing to refer-
ence “Eternal September” as it relates to technology policy. See Paul Ohm, The Rise 
and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 1417, 1430 (2009). 
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nesses needed to transform themselves into software businesses to remain success-
ful,4 but many of the laws, regulations, and policies governing these businesses are 
either outdated or irrelevant in this new technology-dominated world. Some of this 
is due to advancements in technology that have greatly outpaced laws and regula-
tions.5  Some of it is due to a failure to react to technological developments. Law 
schools do not typically cover relevant technologies6 and often encourage students 
with STEM backgrounds to specialize in patent law, leaving other areas of law with 
even less technical expertise. 
Individual privacy has been greatly affected by the gap between the reality of 
information technologies and the mitigations afforded by technology policy. As 
database technologies developed over the decades, they created privacy concerns 
with each new development. Computer scientists were concerned with so-called 
“data banks” and the gap between technical developments and legal awareness of 
these developments as early as 1969.7 Today’s technology dwarfs the power of 
those ancient “data banks.” The average cell phone is more powerful than all of 
NASA at the time of the moon landing in 1969.8 By the end of the century, the pri-
vacy concerns had only escalated.9 
Around this same time, the development of the Internet provided businesses, 
governments, and other organizations with a new avenue to collect information. 
Tracking technologies are critical to basic functions of the Internet, but their devel-
opment held obvious and important implications for privacy, resulting in the first 
                                                          
 4. Marc Andreessen, Why Software is Eating the World, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
11, 2011, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460. 
 5. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO 
STOP IT 11–35 (2008) (discussing the rapid advancements in computers themselves 
and in computer networks). See also Orin Kerr, The Next Generation Communica-
tions Privacy Act, 162 U.  PA. L. REV. 373, 390 (2014) (discussing how the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act was crafted into law to regulate technologies that have 
been obsolete for years). 
 6. See Gene Koo, New Skills, New Learning: Legal Education and the 
Promise of New Technology, Berkman Ctr. Res. Publ’n No. 2007-4 1, 2 (2007) (dis-
cussing the failure of the law school curriculum to prepare lawyers for a workplace 
that demands technology-related skills). 
 7. Lance J. Hoffman, Computers and Privacy: A Survey, 1 no. 2 Computing 
Surveys 1, 85 (1996). Hoffman describes the concern this way: “Most states, howev-
er, lag seriously in awareness of contemporary data processing capabilities and tech-
niques. A few of the more highly computerized areas are, however, trying to ap-
proach the idea of regional data banks in a rational manner.” Id. at 87. 
 8. MICHIO. KAKU. PHYSICS OF THE FUTURE: HOW SCIENCE WILL SHAPE 
HUMAN DESTINY AND OUR DAILY LIVES BY THE YEAR 2100 21 (1st ed. 2011). 
 9. See Daniel. J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394–99 (2001) (detail-
ing how legal approaches to privacy have failed to appropriately address databases). 
See also SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 2–7 (Deborah Russell ed., 1st ed. 2000) (summarizing the threat to 
privacy by databanks and surveillance technology). 
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investigations of the Federal Trade Commission on tracking individuals with tech-
nology.10 
The continuing development of tracking technologies has prevented the estab-
lishment of reliable, well-understood privacy norms, leaving privacy conceptually 
vague and challenging to describe. Users are mostly unaware of tracking technolo-
gies, and the routinely fail to take steps to protect their privacy. Regulators tread 
lightly both to avoid curtailing innovation and to ensure an appropriate response. In 
the absence of privacy norms, businesses pursue technologies that improve their 
services and their profitability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section I, I introduce 
privacy frameworks and summarize why they are too generalized to provide guid-
ance to engineers seeking to build new technologies. In Section II, I examine cur-
rent tracking technologies and use technical details to create a four-element classi-
fication of those technologies that may be useful for policy makers. In Section III, I 
describe how engineers approach ambiguity in legal texts. Finally, I conclude with 
a brief summary and a call for active efforts to improve communication between 
the legal and technical fields. 
II. PROVIDING PRIVACY GUIDANCE FOR TECHNOLOGISTS 
Privacy by Design (PbD) is an excellent example of a policy initiative that 
does not provide enough specific guidance to be practical for software engineers. 
As originally defined by Ann Cavoukian, the Information & Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada, PbD has seven foundational principles: 
1. Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial 
2. Privacy as the Default Setting 
3. Privacy Embedded into Design 
4. Full Functionality–Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum 
5. End-to-End Security 
6. Visibility and Transparency–Keep it Open 
7. Respect for User Privacy–Keep it User-Centric11 
At a glance, these principles are unobjectionable, but they are simply too gen-
eral to be useful. Rubinstein and Good critique these principles as follows:  
Principles 1-3 provide useful, if somewhat repetitive, guidance about the 
                                                          
 10. See FTC, Online Profiling: A Report to Congress, (2000), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/online-profiling-federal-
trade-commission-report-congress/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf ; See also FTC, 
Online Profiling: A Report to Congress Part 2: Recommendations, (2000), 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/934.pdf. 
 11. Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design in Law, Policy and Practice: A White 
Paper for Regulators, Decision-makers and Policy-makers, OFFICE OF THE INFO. AND 
PRIVACY COMM’R/ONT.,  27–29 (2011). 
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importance of considering privacy issues early in the design process and 
setting defaults accordingly, but they stop far short of offering any design 
guidance. Granted, Cavoukian offers more practical advice in several of 
her technology-specific papers, but she makes little effort to systematize or 
even summarize the design principles found therein. Principle 4 seems un-
realistic in an era when some view personal data as the “new oil” of the 
Internet and privacy controls only tend to limit the exploitation of this val-
uable commodity. Principle 5 emphasizes lifecycle management, which is 
a key aspect of privacy engineering. Principle 6 resembles the familiar 
transparency principle found in all versions of FIPs, while Principle 7 
functions primarily as a summing up of the earlier principles.12 
Other high-level privacy frameworks are similarly generic, limiting their utili-
ty for engineers. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD’s) Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows 
of Personal Data serve as a good example because of their statement of the “Fair 
Information Practice” Principles (FIPPs).13 The OECD’s FIPPs influenced the pri-
vacy frameworks developed by the Federal Trade Commission, and both approach-
es have been criticized extensively for their generality.14 These generalized frame-
works remain disconnected from the approaches taken to address privacy in indus-
try.15 
III. TRACKING TECHNOLOGIES 
More specific guidance is required for engineers building technologies that 
may affect consumer privacy, and the only way to provide that guidance is to seek 
to understand the technologies involved. This is a matter of both lawyers seeking 
technical expertise16 and technologists seeking to understand the law.17 The tech-
nologies to be examined must be understood well to craft appropriate standards and 
                                                          
 12. Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactu-
al Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1333, 1338 (2013). 
 13. OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtr
ansborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
 14. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books 
and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 255–60 (2011) (enumerating common 
critiques of FIPPs-based privacy regulation and enforcement). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Peter P. Swire, Trustwrap: The Importance of Legal Rules to Elec-
tronic Commerce and Internet Privacy, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 847, 873–75 (2003) (argu-
ing that for legal privacy protections to be successful, policy makers must carefully 
study the technologies involved). 
 17. Aaron K. Massey & Annie I. Antón, Behavioral Advertising Ethics, in 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND SECURITY ETHICS IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 162, (Melissa Jane Dark ed., 2011). 
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rules. Similarly, technologists must seek to understand the laws and regulations that 
govern their industries. 
Two approaches to technology ethics are useful when considering tracking 
technologies. In the first approach, technologies are considered to be ethically val-
ue-free.18 That is, until they are used for a particular purpose, they are ethically ir-
relevant.19 For example, a hammer can be used to build a tree house or to attack 
someone, and the use entirely determines the ethical evaluation of the scenario.20 
The designer of the hammer may not have considered how it could be used for neg-
ative purposes, or they may not have been able to design a hammer that could func-
tion for its intended purposes without also functioning for negative, unintended 
purposes.21 
In contrast, the second approach to technology ethics considers the design 
process.22 Under this view, tools are imbued with the ethical decisions made by the 
engineers that designed them.23 For example, imagine a hammer that could auto-
matically be hard or soft based on whether it was being used to make a tree house 
or to attack a person. The design of this hammer makes negative uses more difficult 
to perform and less successful than positive uses. Of course, this design comes at a 
cost. Even if it were possible to build a hammer that could make these adjustments, 
it would almost certainly be prohibitively expensive in real-world scenarios. 
With these two perspectives in mind, we now examine four categories of 
tracking technologies around which coherent policy can be formed. First, we exam-
ine tracking technologies that are designed defensively. These are technologies that 
attempt to solve a problem efficiently while maintaining user privacy. Second, we 
examine technologies designed transparently. These technologies may not be de-
signed to maintain user privacy at all costs, but they do take measures to actively 
inform users about their operation and provide users with a measure of control over 
their information. Third, we examine tracking technologies designed to solve a 
problem without regard to user privacy. Finally, we examine surreptitious tracking 
technologies, which are designed to track individuals without their knowledge or 
control. By classifying tracking technologies using these four categories, all of 
which are based on technical design decisions, policy analysts could craft a mean-
ingful privacy framework. 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 169. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Arvind Narayanan, Assistant Professor of computer science at 
Princeton, Opening Comments at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa 
Clara University panel discussion: Privacy by Design (Jan. 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/technology/internet/privacy/privacy-
by-design.html.  
 23. Id. 
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A. Defensive Tracking Technologies 
Cookies are an excellent example of a defensively designed tracking technol-
ogy, but it is necessary to explain the problem they were designed to solve before 
we can detail the defensive measures built into their design. The World Wide Web 
is a collection of hypertext pages accessed over Internet protocols, including the 
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP).24 HTTP is a stateless protocol, which means 
that an HTTP server simply responds to a series of requests without remembering 
any requests it responded to previously.25 From a protocol design standpoint this is 
extremely efficient, and it fits well with the original design goal of providing access 
to a massive collection of interrelated documents.26 Unfortunately, the lack of 
memory severely limits what can be accomplished through a stateless protocol. For 
example, without a mechanism for remembering previous requests, adding any-
thing to a web-based shopping cart or even remembering who was shopping would 
be impossible. These are some of the problems the HTTP cookie was explicitly 
designed to overcome.  
Cookies have two important design decisions that are defensive in nature. 27  
First, cookies are stored on the client (i.e. as a part of a web browser) rather than 
the server.28 This puts control of whether a server remembers a series of actions 
taken in the hands of the user rather than the server.29 If a user wanted to be com-
pletely forgotten after every web request they made, they could instruct their 
browser to never store cookies.30 Second, cookies are only accessible by the web 
domain that set them.31 For example, if you visit www.example.com and 
www.wikipedia.com in that order, then www.wikipedia.com would not be able to 
read any of the information stored in cookies by www.example.com. The designers 
could have chosen to allow all web domains to read any information set in a web 
cookie, but they limited access as strictly as possible while still overcoming the 
limitations of a stateless protocol. 
Cookies still have privacy problems despite their design.32 For example, cook-
ies are simple text files, but there are no constraints that prevent programmers from 
encoding data in a non-human-readable format.33 In an ideal scenario, users may 
wish to examine the information stored in their cookies. This would allow them to 
                                                          
 24. See generally ROY T. FIELDING ET AL., HYPERTEXT TRANSFER 
PROTOCOL--HTTP/1.1 (Jim Gettys  ed., 1999), available at 
http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616.txt. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Aaron K. Massey & Annie I. Antón, Behavioral Advertising Ethics, in 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND SECURITY ETHICS IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 162, 166 (Melissa Jane Dark ed., 2010). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Massey & Antón, supra note 27 at 165. 
33.  See id. at 166. 
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make more informed decisions about what information they would like to continue 
sharing with the websites they visit. Consider also the confusion over opt-in cook-
ies and opt-out cookies. These terms refer to the default data collection practices 
employed by a website.34 An opt-in cookie means that no information about the 
user is collected by default and the user must set a cookie in order for their infor-
mation to be collected.35 An opt-out cookie means that information about the user’s 
interaction with a website would be collected by default but the user could choose 
to inform the server not to collect this information by setting an opt-out cookie.36 
Since no standard exists that allows a user to differentiate between the two, users 
seeking to limit their data collection are left with two unpalatable options when 
managing their cookies: (1) delete them all and remember to manually reset all opt-
out cookies on their next visit to opt-out sites or (2) keep them all and remember to 
manually delete all opt-in cookies on their next visit to opt-in sites. 
Cookies remain the primary mechanism for a website to determine that the 
same computer or device is returning.37 Any policy or regulation attempting to mit-
igate the privacy problems presented by cookies must yield to this basic fact. With-
out the ability to differentiate computers or devices from one another, the Internet 
would be unusable. Replacing the cookie would require massive re-architecting and 
redevelopment of information technologies. Still, cookie-created privacy problems 
can be mitigated. In addition to the dilemma users face, anti-spyware and anti-virus 
software often delete all cookies, including opt-out cookies, by default.38 Creating a 
standard to differentiate between opt-in and opt-out cookies would mitigate these 
situations. 
These problems are perhaps obvious with 20 years of hindsight and a fair 
evaluation of web cookie design would consider that they were initially deployed 
rather early in the history of the modern Internet. Netscape Navigator introduced 
them in 1994 and Microsoft’s Internet Explorer introduced them in 1995.39 It is also 
fair to say that the cost of server hardware and the extremely rapid growth of the 
Internet also influenced the design choices that led to the web cookie.40 Still, for all 
its problems, the HTTP cookie was clearly designed to put users in control. 
                                                          
 34. Massey & Antón, supra note 27. 
 35. Id. at 166. 
 36. Id. 
 37. FTC, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE DISCUSSION 
FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007) [hereinafter FTC],  
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/online-
behavioral-advertising-moving-discussion-forward-possible-self-regulatory-
principles/p859900stmt.pdf. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Massey & Antón, supra note 27. 
 40. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1417 (2009) (detailing the rapid rise of the Internet and its effect on net-
work technologies). 
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B. Transparent Tracking Technologies 
Building a critical mass of users is one of the biggest problems nascent social 
networks must overcome. In 2012, Path — a social networking application — used 
Apple’s API for accessing contact information to build their network.41 Arun 
Thampi, a programmer from Singapore, noticed the problem while using a man-in-
the-middle proxy to examine the Path application on iOS.42 Apple’s API allowed 
Path to query the contacts stored on an iOS device without notifying the user.43 
Using this API, Path simply uploaded the entire contacts of the user’s contacts da-
tabase.44 Here’s how Thampi described his discovery: 
Upon inspecting closer, I noticed that my entire address book (including 
full names, emails and phone numbers) was being sent as a plist to 
Path. Now I don’t remember having given permission to Path to access 
my address book and send its contents to its servers, so I created a com-
pletely new ‘Path’ and repeated the experiment and I got the same result – 
my address book was in Path’s hands.45 
Apple responded to this privacy incident by putting a system in place that no-
tifies the user when applications want permission to access sensitive personal in-
formation, like contacts or location data.46 Such a system provides direct transpar-
ency to the user at the time an application first requests the data.47 Apple also pro-
vided ongoing control to the user in the system settings for iOS, which allows the 
user to periodically review which applications have access to which types of data, 
and they have also included a similar feature in OS X, Apple’s desktop operating 
system.48 These transparencies allow users to understand and control how their in-
formation is being used.49 
Path also responded quickly to the incident. Dave Morin, the CEO and Co-
Founder of Path, as well as an early employee at Facebook, responded to Thampi’s 
blog post by apologizing at length on Path’s company blog:  
We believe you should have control when it comes to sharing your per-
sonal information. We also believe that actions speak louder than words. 
So, as a clear signal of our commitment to your privacy, we’ve deleted 
the entire collection of user uploaded contact information from our 
                                                          
 41. Path Uploads Your Entire iPhone Address Book to its Servers, 
MCLOVIN’S BLOG (Feb. 8, 2012), http://mclov.in/2012/02/08/path-uploads-your-
entire-address-book-to-their- servers.html [hereinafter Path]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Aaron Massey & Travis Breaux, Interference, in INTRODUCTION TO IT 
PRIVACY: A HANDBOOK FOR TECHNOLOGISTS (Travis Breaux ed., 2014). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Path, supra note 41 (emphasis in original). 
 46. Massey & Breaux, supra note 43. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
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servers. Your trust matters to us and we want you to feel completely in 
control of your information on Path.50 
Path’s privacy violation is strikingly similar to the 2010 violation by another 
social network called Google Buzz.51 Google invited Gmail users to try Buzz.52 
Users who accepted the invitation found that Buzz made their Gmail contacts pub-
lically available for others to see as a part of bootstrapping the network.53 Had the 
invitation clearly stated that Gmail contact information would be made public, us-
ers would have been able to make a more informed decision.54 Both Path and 
Google wanted users to connect conveniently with friends on their network.55 To 
that end, they used contact information that was originally collected for one pur-
pose (e.g., private email and phone calls) for another secondary purpose (e.g., boot-
strapping social network relationships).56 Users formally complained about Google 
Buzz to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the FTC found that Google 
had used deceptive business practices.57 As a part of the settlement, Google is re-
quired to comply with third party audits of their privacy practices for the next 20 
years.58 
Transparency is not a perfect solution. There is a risk that regular requests for 
data may turn into mindless click-throughs for users simply seeking to get some-
thing done quickly. 
C. Privacy-oblivious Tracking Technologies 
Although technologies are typically designed with a set of clear purposes in 
mind, they are often used to achieve radically different goals. E-ZPass is an elec-
tronic toll collection system designed to allow motorists to conveniently travel on 
toll roads, over bridges, and through tunnels without paying at a booth for every 
transit.59 This convenience comes with a tradeoff. Each transit is logged for billing 
purposes.60 What was once an ephemeral transaction is now recorded, searchable, 
                                                          
 50. Dave Morin, We Are Sorry, PATH (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://blog.path.com/post/17274932484/we-are-sorry (emphasis in original). 
 51. Fed. Trade Comm., FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in 
Google’s Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Massey & Antón, supra note 27, at 164. 
 56. Fed. Trade Comm., supra note 51. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. See E-ZPASS GROUP, http://www.e-zpassiag.com/about-us (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2015).  
 60. See E-ZPASS GROUP, http://www.e-zpassiag.com/about-e-zpass/how-
does-it-work  (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
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and can be repurposed for other needs. E-ZPass records serve as a good example of 
this and have been repurposed as evidence of cheating in divorce proceedings.61 
Telephone records may be the most famous example of a privacy-oblivious 
tracking technology. Smith v. Maryland addressed the question of whether tele-
phone metadata—the numbers dialed, duration of the call—required a warrant to be 
accessed by law enforcement.62 They do not.63 The Smith decision applied Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence from Katz v. United States, which established that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to areas where people have a “reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.”64 The court found that Smith did not have a reasonable expectation that the 
numbers he was dialing or the duration of the call, which were known to third par-
ties, would remain private.65 This reasoning is known as “third party doctrine.”66 
Third party doctrine is a hotly debated policy topic, and it is central to privacy 
concerns in a cloud-computing world where massive amounts of information—
including extremely sensitive or personal information—is shared with third parties 
through modern technologies like Dropbox or Facebook.67 Critics argue that the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test is too flimsy to be interpreted consistently 
and moves the “reasonableness” burden from the government’s search to the indi-
vidual’s expectation.68 Supporters argue that third party doctrine ensures that the 
Fourth Amendment remains technology neutral—that it will neither expand nor 
contract to protect more or less than it did previously based on new developments 
in technology.69 Regardless of the policy debate, third party doctrine is established 
precedent. Privacy-oblivious technologies or repurposed technologies will continue 
to create an avenue for government requests for potentially sensitive information 
until this precedent changes or better design and engineering practices obviate or 
minimize the exposure of information.70 
                                                          
 61. Chris Newmarker, E-ZPass Records Out Cheaters in Divorce Court, 
NBC NEWS, (Aug. 10, 2007, 3:30 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20216302/.  
 62. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 63. Id. at 745–46.   
 64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). 
 65. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
 66. See generally Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doc-
trine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381 (2008) (introducing Third Party Doctrine). 
 67. Id. at 1401–02. 
 68. Id. at 1383–91 (arguing that Justice Harlan’s test in Katz “does not tether 
courts to solid conceptual footings” and that “the Fourth Amendment focuses on the 
reasonableness of the government’s actions in undoing that privacy, not on the rea-
sonableness of the individual’s expectations.”). 
 69. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 
580 (2009) (arguing that “[i]f we accept that the Fourth Amendment should stay 
technology neutral, then we should accept that rule both when new technological 
practices threaten to expand Fourth Amendment protection as when they threaten to 
constrict it. Just as the Fourth Amendment should protect that which technology ex-
poses, so should the Fourth Amendment permit access to that which technology 
hides.”). 
 70. Massey and Breaux, supra note 43.  
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Although government requests for information are a good example of the pri-
vacy implications of repurposed technologies, they are not the only example. Inter-
net browsers may be uniquely identifiable even without the use of technologies 
explicitly designed for identification, like IP addresses or cookies.71 Information 
theory lends an explanation for this. Information entropy is a measure of the uncer-
tainty of an information source.72 For example, if we know an individual’s gender, 
birthday, and home zip code, then we may be in a position to uniquely identify 
them. Latanya Sweeney famously used this information to identify Governor Wil-
liam Weld’s record in a publicly released dataset.73 She also determined that these 
three pieces of information would uniquely identify 87% of the U.S. population.74 
In another study, two computer scientists used the same principles of information 
theory to re-identify approximately 80% of the individuals in a supposedly anony-
mous dataset released by Netflix for the purpose of soliciting improvements to their 
movie recommendation algorithms.75 These broad findings about the challenge of 
releasing data in a truly anonymous format have inspired quite a bit of debate 
among academics.76 
In the case of an Internet browser, all the information the browser provides to 
the client reduces information entropy.77 For example, browsers communicate their 
set of installed plugins and a user-agent string,78 which is defined as a part of the 
HTTP specification, to allow servers to know what technologies they have availa-
ble for rendering web content.79 This information may be enough to uniquely iden-
tify a web browser. Peter Eckersley demonstrated a browser fingerprinting tech-
nique, called Panopticlick, which was able to uniquely identify 94.2% of browsers 
based on information transmitted by browsers for purposes other than unique iden-
                                                          
 71. See Peter Eckersley, How Unique is Your Web Browser?, ELEC. 
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ing Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703 (2010) (highlighting the 
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tification.80 Clearly, if privacy is not considered as a central design concern in the 
development of a new technology, the resulting privacy-oblivious technology may 
pose serious privacy concerns for future users. 
D. Surreptitious Tracking Technologies 
A great many technologies are designed to track individuals without their 
knowledge. The government designs some of these technologies for law enforce-
ment and other surveillance purposes. Businesses design some of these technolo-
gies to further their own ends. All of them are designed with two key goals in mind: 
(1) to track users in some context and (2) to avoid detection by the users being 
tracked.81 In the context of the brief ethics discussion at the beginning of this sec-
tion, these are all technologies with ethical imperatives embedded into their de-
sign.82 
Perhaps the perfect example of a surreptitious tracking technology is the 
StingRay. Originally designed by the Harris Corporation, the StingRay is a branded 
version of a technology known as an International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
catcher or IMSI-catcher.83 The operation of a StingRay can be summarized suc-
cinctly.84 During normal operation, cell phones regularly communicate with cellu-
lar base stations or cell sites.85 These communications allow the cellular network to 
route and connect text messages or incoming calls, and they are a necessary part of 
the network. The StingRay imitates a cell site, allowing it to collect in real time 
location data, text messages, and the content of incoming calls.86 It is small enough 
to be handheld, carried in a vehicle, or even mounted to a drone.87 StingRays are 
used by intelligence agencies, the military, and law enforcement. They are impossi-
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ble for communicating parties to detect, and they can operate without the assistance 
of telecommunications companies.88 
Consider this tracking scenario, which is only possible to do with a StingRay. 
A suspected criminal seeks to use a burner phone for the first time. Law enforce-
ment on the ground positively identify the suspect making a phone call while walk-
ing into a store from a public street. Using their StingRay, they are able to capture a 
single call coming from a mobile phone inside the store. The contents of the call 
confirm that the individual is the suspect they are seeking, and they are able to ar-
rest the individual exiting the store. Even in this scenario, the StingRay must, as a 
part of its normal operation, intercept data from other mobile devices in the area. 
Law enforcement can positively identify the suspect’s phone call by relying on the 
signal strength. These innocent third parties would never know that their data was 
intercepted or that they were tracked by law enforcement. 
StingRays raise many important legal questions about surveillance technolo-
gies,89 but perhaps the most interesting aspect of the StingRay is its technical opera-
tion. The StingRay and other IMSI-catchers rely on cellular network protocols that 
have been designed into devices and cell sites for decades. Although previously 
only available to governments willing to pay as much as $400,000, it is now possi-
ble for dedicated private hobbyists to build homemade IMSI-catchers for less than 
$1,000.90 These technologies will only become cheaper, and the longer the cellular 
network infrastructure remains vulnerable, the cost to prevent their operation91 will 
only become more expensive. 
Surreptitious tracking technologies are not exclusively designed for use by 
governments; they are also designed by businesses.92 Apple’s Safari web browser 
blocks third party cookies by default, which makes placing the initial cookie need-
ed to track users more difficult for third party ad networks.93 In 2011, Google by-
passed this default setting to set a cookie for their advertising network without noti-
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fying their users and in violation of their stated privacy practices.94 These actions 
resulted in a fine of $22.5 million from the Federal Trade Commission in 201295 
and a settlement of $17 million for a case involving 37 states and the District of 
Columbia.96 
Verizon employs a different technique for tracking users without their 
knowledge: they simply inject a unique identifier as an extra HTTP header for all 
web traffic generated on Verizon devices.97 The design of this technology allows 
Verizon devices to be tracked even if subscribers have opted out, cleared their 
cookies, or used private browsing mode.98 A wide variety of advertising agencies 
relied on Verizon’s unique header and were able to use it to re-construct cookies 
that were missing or deleted by the user, allowing them to continue tracking users 
who attempted to prevent themselves from being tracked.99 
Surreptitious tracking technologies rely in part on secrecy. The companies 
behind these technologies use nondisclosure agreements and intellectual property 
protections to prevent scrutiny.100 Prosecutors have dropped serious criminal charg-
es to protect the details of law enforcement use of StingRay devices.101 If these 
technologies are not well understood by regulators, policy makers, and consumers, 
then no legal framework for privacy can sufficiently address the resulting viola-
tions. 
IV. AMBIGUITY IN LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
The privacy frameworks outlined in Section II are insufficient not because 
they contain ambiguities, but because they contain ambiguities that provide too 
little context to be disambiguated. Laws and regulations often contain intentional 
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ambiguity.102 For example, regulators sometimes employ generalized standards for 
information technology rather than explicit rules detailing precise functionality.103 
Consider the simple example of encryption technologies. An explicit rule would 
require a particular encryption algorithm, such as 256-bit AES encryption.104 Ex-
plicitly requiring a strong encryption standard in a regulation may appear to be a 
best practice, but it actually has a critical weakness: what if the encryption standard 
is found later to be broken? How will the regulation be updated? Instead of an ex-
plicit rule, a general standard could be adopted. For example, the regulation could 
require the use “reasonably secure encryption mechanisms.” This phrasing is inten-
tionally ambiguous. The engineer implementing technologies that must comply 
with this standard must reify the phrase into a specific encryption technique, and 
the regulatory system in which the technology is deployed must be able to deter-
mine whether a given encryption technique qualifies as “reasonably secure.” 
Generalized standards require technical expertise to be interpreted. Unfortu-
nately, traditional approaches to requirements engineering are not sufficient for 
engineers seeking to disambiguate these regulations; engineers and policy makers 
must collaborate to successfully interpret intentionally ambiguous standards.105 For 
these scenarios, engineers need new methods to improve and demonstrate legal 
compliance in software systems.106 Evidence suggests that although individual en-
gineers are able to identify portions of a legal text that are ambiguous, they vary 
greatly on their classifications of these ambiguities.107 Improving regulatory com-
pliance in requirements engineering is an active area of research,108 and it is an op-
portunity for policy makers and engineers to collaborate to improve compliance. 
Ambiguity that can consistently be interpreted by both policy makers and en-
gineers must be the goal for future privacy regulations. The four categories of 
tracking technologies outlined in Section III are intentionally ambiguous; they de-
                                                          
102. Paul N. Otto, Reasonableness Meets Requirements: Regulating Security 
and Privacy in Software, 59 DUKE L.J. 309, 314 (2009). 
103. Id. (arguing that broad standards allow engineers and policy makers the 
flexibility needed to allow regulations the flexibility needed to successfully achieve 
their intended outcomes). 
104. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Announcing the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES), FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 
STANDARDS PUBLICATION 197 (November 26, 2001), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf. 
105. Aaron K. Massey et al., Identifying and Classifying Ambiguity for Regu-
latory Requirements, REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING CONFERENCE (RE), 2014 IEEE 
22ND INTERNATIONAL (2014), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/RE.2014.6912250. 
106. Otto, supra note 102. 
107. Id. 
108. This is evidenced by a distinct increase in publications involving legal 
compliance concerns at the annual IEEE International Requirements Engineering 
Conference and by the development of the International Workshop on Requirements 
Engineering and Law. See Workshop Overview, Eighth International Workshop on 
Requirements Engineering and Law (Aug. 25, 2015), 
http://gaius.isri.cmu.edu/relaw/2015/. 
710 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51 
 
scribe generally four types of tracking technologies based on technical design as-
pects of those technologies.109 Although these categories are limited to a specific 
context (i.e., tracking technologies), they are general enough to cover the context 
and remain interpretable by, and therefore useful to, both engineers and policy 
makers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Effective communication between engineers and policy makers must become 
commonplace to protect privacy and improve the state of technology policy. Engi-
neers must seek to better understand and incorporate laws and regulations into the 
design of their technologies; this is not only an ethical imperative,110 but it is also a 
critical aspect of developing professional standards for software engineering. Poli-
cy makers and lawyers must seek to understand the technologies beyond a surface 
level. Far too often policy makers identify a general policy solution or principle and 
then fail to state it with enough specificity to be accessible to the engineers building 
tomorrow’s technologies. 
The development of new technologies continues. As everyday things become 
computerized and the Internet of Things becomes a reality, we will once again ex-
perience a societal shift in our understanding of technology that will undoubtedly 
affect laws and regulations. The collection of Big Data and its analysis by algo-
rithms kept secret by governments and businesses will also strain our ability to craft 
coherent regulation. These developments will preserve our eternal September un-
less engineers and policy makers undertake a concerted effort to get to October 
together. 
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